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Executive Summary
Europe has two faces. On the one hand, there was a time when Europeans were
enchanted by the miracle of integration. After having experienced bitter centuries
of war and enmity, imperial devastation, and outbursts of nationalism, the nations
of Europe had begun to move in precisely the opposite direction.Yet, although the
European success story continues to this day, it also resembles the description of a
distant epoch. Perceptions of the European Union are increasingly characterized by
a resurgence of national egoism and declining levels of public approval.
In this situation it is helpful to recall the problem at the heart of the issue of inte-
gration, which is the conceptual schism among the member states. Contradictory
and irreconcilable attitudes toward the future of Europe confront each other. The
arguments are ostensibly about treaty texts, though deep down it is a matter of
antagonistic views of the shape of things to come. If it proves impossible to reach
some kind of agreement about the future political order of the continent, the
Europe of 25 and soon more member states may well go into decline, and may pos-
sibly even fall apart. This problem cannot be resolved until the issue has been
openly discussed.
The principal strategic question concerning the future of the EU continues to
remain unanswered. Why is there a need to undertake new efforts, why is it neces-
sary to mobilize new powers? The answer to this question is linked to the new con-
stellations and conditions of world politics. It has to do with Europe’s ability to
shape developments in a new global order. Europe’s future is increasingly being
determined by developments taking place beyond its borders. There is a danger
that the old continent will gradually become marginalized. Europe must not only
react to these developments, it also has the potential to inject its own ideas into
the formulation of the rules governing the new economic and political world order.
Both Europe’s ability to exert its influence and the fate of the European continent
depend on whether the Europeans will be able to renew the “European answer”in
a manner that enables them to respond effectively to future challenges. Providing
Europe with a new raison d’être requires the EU to assert itself both internally and
externally, and to clearly communicate the reasons for further European integra-
tion to citizens. This tripartite task elicits three strategic responses:
(1) If the EU wishes to assert itself internally it will need a “strategy of institutional
efficiency” in order to ensure that an enlarged Europe is capable of acting and
functioning effectively.
A task for the future will be to ensure the institutional efficiency of the European
Union in the wake of further deepening and widening. In this respect two things
will be particularly important: the outcome of the EU’s constitutional process and dif-
ferentiation in Europe.
The rejection of the European Constitution by the electorate in two EU founding
states means that another historic attempt to provide Europe with a reliable poli-
tical order has probably failed. Nonetheless, the EU-25+ still requires a new pri-
mary law. Numerous alternative proposals to the Constitutional Treaty have been
put on the table in the aftermath of the negative referendum results. A pragmatic
option would be to identify the principal constitutional innovations and to incor-
porate them into the primary law currently in force by means of a treaty amending
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the current Treaties. A “Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice”seems a realistic alter-
native, which would not contradict the vote of the French and Dutch electorates,
yet at the same time would secure the implementation of the basic constitutional
reforms.
However, the efficiency of an enlarged Europe will not merely be determined by
the future political and structural organization of the EU. Increasingly diverse
interests and the growing complexity of decision-making in the enlarged Union
make it necessary, far more than in the past, to resort to the possibilities of differ-
entiated integration. In political practice, using instruments of differentiation to
solve technical questions will not lead to an exclusive core of states, but to diver-
gent leadership coalitions. The sum total of the individual cooperation projects and
the intersection of the participating countries will create an “open area of gravita-
tion”, that attracts other EU states to engage in a more intense level of coopera-
tion. If differentiation is construed and applied in this way, a Europe of 30 and
more member states will continue to be governable and ready to meet the chal-
lenges of the future.
(2) If the EU wishes to assert itself externally it will need a “strategy for shaping
global politics”in order to strengthen the role of Europe, both in its immediate
neighbourhood and in the global arena.
The global political situation is currently characterized by changed constellations
involving new powers and unprecedented challenges. Europe cannot simply afford
to stand on the sidelines at a historic moment when economic and political devel-
opments require the establishment of new forms of international order.
As a result of enlargement the EU borders on sensitive neighbouring regions that
call for specific strategic responses. The EU has a special responsibility toward
Southeastern Europe. The prospect of accession for the states of the Western
Balkans promotes reforms and western-oriented and liberal political forces in the
countries concerned, and is in the fundamental interests of the EU and its mem-
ber states. The integration of the Western Balkans into the EU is not a question of
whether or not, but of when and how.
However, the attractiveness of Europe does not end in the Balkans. Other states
are pushing very hard to join the EU. The start of accession negotiations with
Turkey means that Europe has finally come to a point where it no longer has defin-
itive borders. Europe urgently needs to understand the strategic ramifications of
the path on which it has embarked. In view of these prospects the EU (i) should
not principally shut its doors to newcomers, (ii) should at the same time not grant
any further binding accession offers beyond the Western Balkans and Turkey, (iii)
should continue to deepen relations with neighbouring European states in the
context of a differentiated policy toward Eastern Europe, and (iv) should intensify
the partnership with Russia.
The European Union is a factor to be reckoned with in world politics on account
alone of its sheer size and economic strength. However, Europe is a very vulnera-
ble actor. And no member state acting on its own is in a position to master the new
global challenges. The assertion of global interests requires a more determined ef-
fort to pool European defence capabilities by creating a European Army with the
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appropriate organizational and command structures on the European level. The
creation of integrated armed forces would enhance Europe’s military capabilities
and tie the states of Europe closer together in the field of security policy than at
any time in their history. Interlinking national security and defence policies in this
way would increase the pressure on EU member states to overcome the current
deficit in strategic thinking and to speak with one voice regarding even the most
sensitive foreign policy issues.
(3) The EU will have to adopt a “strategy for the promotion of European self-assur-
ance”in order to regain popular support.
Europe is stuck in a mental crisis of orientation. The current lack of orientation is
not a specifically European but a general phenomenon. In the age of globalization,
established patterns of interpretation have begun to disintegrate everywhere in the
world. A hitherto unparalleled degree of mobility, pluralism and flexibility has led
to the breakdown of traditional types of identification. As a result there is a funda-
mental need for guidance. The European Union, as an evolving political system,
must provide its citizens with a sense of orientation if it wishes to overcome its
current crisis of legitimacy.
In order to strengthen European self-assurance, the EU should pursue two things:
a gradual politicization of European politics, and a new raison d’être underpinned by a
new grand project.
Politicization means (i) ensuring that the principle of opposition, which is the life-
blood of any political system, becomes firmly entrenched in the EU, (ii) discussing
publicly differences of opinion concerning specific European policy issues, (iii)
Europeanizing national political debates, (iv) personalizing European politics, and
(v) dramatizing European elections by enabling EU citizens to exert a direct
influence on the appointment of the Commission President. In sum, the gradual
politicization of the EU would constitute a decisive step toward a more mature
political system.
Moreover, Europe needs a convincing and plain answer to a simple question. What
do we need the EU for in the future – beyond the preservation of what has already
been achieved? The European Union as a dynamic economic, political and securi-
ty policy project that is able to shape both internal and external developments in a
dynamic global environment: Putting this abstract formula in concrete terms is a
prerequisite for conveying the necessity of future integration steps. The art of
European politics will be to combine the new raison d’être with an ambitious yet
realistic grand project that reflects the principal idea of a new Europe.
Europe’s internal and external vulnerability underscores the need to pursue a
grand project in the area of security. Greater security policy integration can procure
benefits for the member states and their citizens that the individual countries can
no longer provide on their own. If policymakers succeed in making the European
Union a coherent actor in all aspects of internal and external security, Europe will
be in a position to make a decisive contribution toward shaping the future inter-
national order. The epochal decision to embark on the unification project once
brought peace and prosperity to the European continent. It is now time to view the
success of the European project from a global perspective.
Ongoing success story
Symptoms of crisis: national
egoism and declining approval
ratings
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Europe’s Strategic Responses
Europe has two faces. On the one hand, there was a time when Europeans were
enchanted by the miracle of integration. After having experienced bitter centuries
of war and enmity, imperial devastation, and outbursts of nationalism, the nations
of Europe had begun to move in precisely the opposite direction. The establish-
ment of a European community became the main driving force of the post-war era.
Two important sources of vitality provided unsuspected reserves of power for this
historic revolution: on the one hand the hope for peace among the former enemies
in Europe and security in view of the threat from the East, and on the other expec-
tations of economic prosperity through a common market. Both visions became
reality. Europe began to be seen as a model of peace and prosperity that was ad-
mired throughout the world. In the early 1980s, when there were nascent signs of
fatigue and talk of “eurosclerosis”, the strategic thinking of Jacques Delors helped
to give a new impetus to the integration project. The establishment of the single
market, the disappearance of border controls in the Schengen area, and the intro-
duction of the euro provide impressive evidence of the European success story.
This success story is ongoing. After the historic enlargement round of 1 May 2004,
when ten new countries joined the EU, the reunification of the continent will con-
tinue with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. On 1 January 2007 Slovenia will
become the first new member state to adopt the euro; at the same time the
Eurozone strengthens its political profile. The important role of the EU in the
negotiations leading to the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia constitutes a good
example of its stabilizing power in its immediate neighbourhood. Global EU civil-
ian and military crisis management missions, the establishment of the European
Defence Agency, and the formation of battle groups provide evidence of the ongo-
ing development of European Security and Defence Policy. Agreement on the EU
Financial Perspective for 2007-2013, the adoption of the Services Directive, the
start of a debate about energy security, the progress concerning the development
of the European Galileo satellite navigation system and the enduring external
attractiveness of the integration project are further evidence for the continuing
vitality of the European Union.
Yet at the same time the European success story nowadays resembles the descrip-
tion of a distant epoch. Perceptions of the European Union are increasingly cha-
racterized by national egoism and declining levels of public approval. Joint
attempts to modernize the European economic area as part of the Lisbon strategy
have made little headway. In many member states the stability pact concerning the
common currency is increasingly perceived as an obstacle to effective financial and
monetary policy. Rising resistance to European mergers and takeover bids is a sign
of a new economic nationalism. At the same time, enlargement fatigue and doubts
about the compatibility between deepening and widening are increasingly wide-
spread. Many politicians and sections of the public are increasingly beginning to
cast doubt on the ability of the European Union to absorb further states. The con-
stitutional process has come to a standstill, and reflections about the future of this
process have failed to yield any tangible results. EU citizens and sections of the 
elites are losing confidence in the unification project. The erstwhile dynamism
seems to have evaporated. Europe seems exhausted.
In this situation it is helpful to recall the problem at the heart of the issue of inte-
gration, which is the conceptual schism among the member states. Contradictory
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Heart of the problem:
a conceptual schism
Europe’s ability to
shape developments
in a new world order
Three strategic responses
and irreconcilable attitudes toward the future of Europe collide. Whereas some
construe the idea of the “United States of Europe”as a survival strategy for the con-
tinent, others are keen to emphasize that they have merely joined an internal mar-
ket. This profound disagreement over the EU’s ultimate direction threatens to
abruptly end the success story of European integration. The basic consensus over
European integration policy is a thing of the past. The arguments are ostensibly
about treaty texts, though deep down it is a matter of antagonistic views of the
shape of things to come. If it proves impossible to reach some kind of agreement
about the future political order of the continent, the Europe of 25 and soon more
member states may well go into decline, and may possibly even fall apart. This
problem cannot be resolved until the issue has been openly discussed.
The principal strategic question continues to remain unanswered. Why is there a
need to undertake new efforts, why is it necessary to mobilize new powers?
The answer to this question is linked to the new constellations and conditions of
world politics. It has to do with Europe’s ability to shape developments in a new
global order. After the end of the Cold War, the rise of new economic and political
powers in Asia and South America, and the globalization of economy and securi-
ty, Europe’s future is increasingly being determined by developments taking place
beyond its borders. There is a danger that the European continent will gradually
become marginalized. Europe must not only react to these developments, it has
the potential to inject its own ideas into the formulation of the rules governing the
new economic and political world order.
European unification was and continues to be Europe’s response to a rapidly chang-
ing world. Europe’s ability to exert its influence depends on whether the Europeans
are able to renew the “European answer”in a manner that enables them to respond
effectively to future challenges. This does not require the reinvention of the wheel.
The future European Union will to a significant extent be based on its historical
achievements and structures. The cornerstone of the European house continues to
be the fact that it is a project dedicated to peace. However, other aspects now deserve
greater attention: A Europe whose transnational governmental structures need to be
improved. A Europe that takes on global responsibilities. A Europe that is not mere-
ly a project of the elites, but that includes citizens in its decision-making processes.
These cornerstones must be pieced together to establish a foundation for the future.
Providing Europe with a new raison d’être requires the EU to assert itself both inter-
nally and externally, and to clearly communicate the reasons for further European
integration to citizens. This tripartite task elicits three strategic responses:
(1) If the EU wishes to assert itself internally it will need a “strategy of institutional
efficiency” in order to ensure that an enlarged Europe is capable of acting and
functioning effectively.
(2) If the EU wishes to assert itself externally it will need a “strategy for shaping glo-
bal politics” in order to strengthen the role of Europe, both in its immediate
neighbourhood and in the global arena.
(3) Communicating the reasons for further integration to EU citizens requires a
“strategy for the promotion of European self-assurance” in order to regain popular
support.
Alternatives to the
Constitutional Treaty
Retention of Treaty of Nice
not a feasible option
Little chance of retaining
Constitutional Treaty
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I. A Strategy of Institutional Efficiency
A structural feature of Europe’s institutional architecture is the fact that it is con-
stantly changing. Deepening and geographical widening make it necessary to
establish a system which is both stable and able to adapt. Criticizing the slow pace
of the reforms may in fact be justified, but one should always remember that in the
end the member states have always managed to agree on and to implement
reforms. From this point of view the European Union seems far more capable of
reform than many other political systems. A task for the future will be to guaran-
tee institutional efficiency in the event of further deepening and widening. In this
connection two things will be particularly important: the outcome of the EU’s con-
stitutional process and differentiation in Europe.
Europe’s Constitutional Process
The European Union is no longer a relatively insignificant political entity. On
account of its interwoven structures and the competences that have been confer-
red upon it, it has become the centre of political power on the European continent.
The extent of European integration has reached a level that inevitably leads to
questions about the internal structure of the European Union. Europe, which like
a magnet has attracted an increasing number of tasks and members, longs for
more institutionalized reliability. It is no longer an entity that merely elicits emo-
tions and visions, but a provider of public goods and thus the focal point of high
expectations.
Following the rejection of the Constitution by the electorate in two of the EU’s
founding member states another historic attempt to provide a reliable political
order for Europe appears to have failed. But the EU must nonetheless optimize its
procedures in order to act effectively in the future. The European Union needs
faces in order to make it more visible to citizens, and in order to better assign
responsibilities. It also needs improved opportunities for involving both national
parliaments and citizens. A number of alternatives to the Constitutional Treaty
have been suggested:
– The retention of the Treaty of Nice currently in force is to all intents and purposes
not a viable option. The EU-25+ cannot be governed on the basis of a set of
rules and regulations that in essence was originally conceived for six states.
Without meaningful amendments to the Treaty of Nice the European Union will
sooner or later experience a dramatic crisis of legitimacy. The massive distortion
that results from the current weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers is
no longer tenable from a democratic point of view. The number of citizens and
the number of states, which are taken into account in the Constitution’s “dou-
ble majority” decision-making procedure, are the only categories of legitimacy
in the age of democracy.
– The option of holding on to the original Constitutional Treaty presupposes that the
new primary law will be presented unaltered to the French and Dutch elector-
ates in another referendum. However, the chances that a second referendum
will lead to the desired result seem rather slim.
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“Cherry-picking” parts of the
Constitution impossible due to
the opposition of individual
member states
Combining Parts I and II of
Constitution difficult to com-
municate and a time-consu-
ming process
Pragmatic option: Treaty
Amending the Treaty of Nice
Arguments for an
amendment treaty
Principal innovations
in a “Treaty Amending the
Treaty of Nice”
– The option of “making the most of Nice” is not sufficient to ensure the enlarged
EU’s future efficiency or to enhance its democratic legitimacy. The implementa-
tion of constitutional innovations on the basis of the existing Treaties and thus
beneath the level of formal amendments to primary law – for example, in the
shape of inter-institutional agreements or modified rules of procedure – is
unlikely to be achieved in many important cases. Attempts to unravel the pack-
age as a whole and to “cherry-pick” individual elements of the Constitutional
Treaty will come up against opposition from certain member states and thus fail.
– Another option would be to present the electorate with a “shortened constitu-
tion” using the terminology of a “basic treaty” and combining Parts I and II of
the Constitutional Treaty. This alternative is also rather problematic. On the one
hand, the opponents of the Constitution will argue that it is simply duplicitous.
On the other hand, this alternative would also require a revision of Part III of
the constitutional text. This would definitely be an extremely time-consuming
process that could not be completed without calling yet another Convention.
A pragmatic option would be to transfer the core of the constitutional innovations
into primary law in the shape of a treaty amending the Treaty of Nice. The provo-
catively titled “Constitution” would be transformed into a modest revision of the
Treaty of Nice, thereby making it possible to incorporate the core of the constitu-
tional innovations into the existing Treaties. To do this, it would be necessary to
identify the central reforms of the Constitution and combine them in the shape of
a treaty amending the primary law currently in force.
A “Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice” represents a realistic option that respects
the vote of the French and Dutch electorates, and at the same time allows the
implementation of the central elements laid down in the Constitutional Treaty.
None of the controversies in the member states were sparked off by the core of the
Constitution. The considerable improvements made by the Constitution with
regard to the EU’s efficiency, transparency and democratic legitimation have not
been called into question. However, the Constitution was badly flawed from the
very beginning. The text is too long, too complicated, and incomprehensible. For
this reason the opponents of the Constitution were able to insinuate all sorts of
things about the document with impunity. Furthermore, the text was simply crying
out to be a vehicle for the expression of domestic frustrations. The ‘No’ votes
amounted to a rejection of the national governments concerned, and were the
result of unfounded mythological fears.
A “Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice”should include the following constitutional
innovations:
(1) the reform of the EU’s institutional system,
(2) the development of the decision-making and voting procedures,
(3) the reform and enhancement of the instruments of differentiated integration
and
(4) other constitutional innovations.
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 4 · 2006 Page 11
Personalization as basis for
more continuity, visibility and
consistency
“Double majority”, extension
of majority voting, rights of
national parliaments
Reform of enhanced
cooperation, new
differentiation instruments
in ESDP
Incorporation of Charter
of Fundamental Rights,
competence categories,
passerelle clauses, treaty
amendment procedure
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(1) Reform of the institutional system
The Constitution’s central institutional reforms should be incorporated into the
current Treaties. They primarily comprise the appointment of an elected President
of the European Council, the introduction of a European Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and the reduction in the size of the European Commission and the
strengthening of its President. The personalization of the architecture of European
leadership makes it possible to achieve a clear assignment of responsibilities on
the EU level and strengthens the continuity, visibility and consistency of European
policymaking.
(2) The development of the decision-making and voting procedures
If the EU wishes to keep its ability to take action and to enhance its democratic
legitimacy, it needs to reform the decision-making procedures in the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament, and assign a more prominent role to the
national parliaments. The introduction of the “double majority” procedure consti-
tutes a milestone in the history of the European Union. Using the number of citi-
zens and the number of states as a basis for decision-making in the Council of
Ministers reflects the two strands of legitimacy in the EU. The double majority rule
makes it more difficult for member states to form blocking coalitions and promotes
the ability to form constructive majorities. Furthermore, the extension of majority
decisions in the Council of Ministers is essential for the problem-solving compe-
tence of an enlarged EU. Finally, the rights of national parliaments should be
enhanced, (early warning mechanism), elements of direct democracy should be
introduced (citizens’ initiative), and the European Parliament should be given
greater budgetary powers and co-decision rights in the legislative process.
(3) Reform and enhancement of the instruments of differentiated integration
In the enlarged EU the interests of the member states are becoming more and
more diverse. For this reason strategies of differentiated integration are particular-
ly important. Blockades or the lack of political will in certain member states in the
fields of monetary, internal and social policy were already in the past overcome
with the help of differentiation, thereby promoting the process of integration. The
amendment of the current Treaties should include the reforms of the existing flexi-
bility instruments laid down in the Constitution (enhanced cooperation) and
adopt the new instruments especially in the area of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP).
(4) Other constitutional innovations
Finally, a series of central provisions of the European Constitution should be adop-
ted as part of a reform of the current Treaties. These include the legally binding
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the introduction of compe-
tence categories, the adoption of the so-called “passerelle” or “bridging clauses”,
which aim to make it easier to reform the European Treaties, the adoption of the
solidarity clause, and the introduction of the mutual defence clause. It is also of
fundamental importance to reform the procedure for future revisions of EU prima-
ry law. Here the Constitutional Treaty does not go far enough. The European Union
needs a binding procedure for the eventuality that the new primary law cannot
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A “slimmed down”
constitutional text
in two parts
Directing strategic
development at EU-30+
Diversity of interests and
decision-making complexity
require different speeds
Islands of differentiated
integration not tantamount 
to a closed core Europe
enter into force on account of non-ratification by a small number of member 
states. Ever since the “No” votes in France and the Netherlands it has become 
evident that the agreed procedure whereby such matters are referred to the
European Council is insufficient.
The  modesty of a “Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice” offers a realistic solution
for the current constitutional crisis. In this way the failure of one project might pro-
vide the impetus for a decisive spurt ahead. The next step would be to elaborate
and adopt a less voluminous text that contains only the principal constitutional
provisions while relegating the detailed non-constitutional provisions to a text
below the constitutional level. Such a “division of the treaties” would provide the
grounds for a readable constitutional document that corresponds both to the
requirements of European governance and to the expectations of citizens.
Basically the European Union needs to prepare for the likely scenario that in the
medium to long term it will comprise far more than 30 member states. Instead of
wringing their hands over the possibility that the integration process in an enlarg-
ing Europe might grind to a standstill, decision-makes must not allow reforms to
be deferred indefinitely. The strategic development of the EU must be directed
toward preparing the Union for the membership of far more countries than it has
today.
Differentiation in Europe
The efficiency of  Europe will not only be determined  by the future political and
structural organization of the EU. The increasing diversity of interests and the grow-
ing complexity of decision-making call for a greater degree of active and visible
political management. More than ever before Europe needs various speeds in
order to remain effective. Citizens expect the EU to provide state-like services in
areas as diverse as justice and home affairs, foreign, security, defence, tax, environ-
mental, and social policy. However, not all of the member states can or may wish
to provide such services at the same time and with the same intensity. As was the
case in the past with the common currency, the Schengen accords, or social policy,
closer cooperation among a small group of countries can help to overcome a situ-
ation of stalemate and improve the way in which the European Union functions.
However, the formation of islands of differentiated integration should not be
equated with the creation of a closed core Europe in which a small group of states
determines the nature and fate of integration. Discussions about a Europe of tri-
umvirates, directorates or pioneer groups – which some demand and others fear –
are unrealistic and counter-productive. They are unrealistic because the idea of a
closed core Europe in which a small group of countries continues to develop the
unification process is unfeasible. The vast majority of the member states will want
to belong to the group moving ahead – if only in order to prevent the establish-
ment of a small leadership circle. Thus the creation of an exclusive core Europe
presupposes that a small number of states would openly reject the wish of its EU
partners to participate. None of the potential core countries would have any such
intention.
Debates about the establishment of a core Europe are also counter-productive.
Threats and conceptual misunderstandings overshadow the fact that differentia-
Counter-productive debate
over a core Europe
Using the instrument of
enhanced cooperation
Open area of gravitation
Transforming the logic
of integration
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tion provides a key strategic opportunity. Bringing the whole notion of differenti-
ated integration into disrepute makes it impossible to utilize its formative poten-
tial to the full. Equating differentiation with a core Europe misses the key point
that differentiated integration constitutes an opportunity to implement sensible
proposals for cooperation even if the support and participation of all EU member
states is not forthcoming. As a result, the ensuing climate of mistrust causes 
promising projects to remain tucked away in a drawer.
The real potential of increased differentiation in Europe will be revealed only in
practice. In the years ahead greater use should be made of the various kinds of dif-
ferentiated integration than has hitherto been the case. It will be particularly
important that the EU institutions and the member states become familiar with the
instrument of enhanced cooperation that was introduced in the Treaty of
Amsterdam and modified by the Treaty of Nice and the Constitutional Treaty. The
instrument, which has not been employed yet, should initially be used in the con-
text of smaller differentiation projects in various policy areas. Only then will it be
possible to ascertain how well the current legal provisions concerning enhanced
cooperation work in practice and where improvements are needed in order to
increase the usefulness of this key instrument of differentiation.
In political practice, using instruments of differentiation to solve technical ques-
tions will not lead to an exclusive core of states, but to divergent leadership coali-
tions. The sum total of the individual cooperation projects and the intersection of
the participating countries will create an “open area of gravitation” that attracts
other EU states to engage in a more intense level of cooperation. While all mem-
ber states enjoy the basic right to participate in differentiation schemes, this right
should not be allowed to jeopardize the success of individual differentiation pro-
jects. As a result, participation in specific projects must be linked to the fulfillment
of certain prerequisites. Thus, the open area of gravitation will, for a certain length
of time and in certain policy areas, lead to a Europe of different speeds.
The transformation in the logic of integration will change the face of the European
Union, which has hitherto been dominated by the logic of joint action taken simul-
taneously by all member states and by legal uniformity. Such a step also entails
risks. The transition to a differentiated Europe should thus be pursued cautiously,
and certain core components of integration must remain binding for all member
states. If differentiation is conceived of and implemented in this way, Europe of
eventually 30 and more member states will continue to be governable and capable
of mastering future challenges.
II. A Strategy for Shaping Global Politics
The individual European states do not possess sufficient power to have a significant
influence on global politics. Yet even the European Union, which for a long period
of time appeared to compensate for the loss of national influence, has reached its
limits. In global terms the significance of Europe has relatively declined. As the
fundamental decision “in favour of Europe”was taken decades ago, it is now in the
vital interest of its members to provide the European Union with the resources and
instruments it needs in order to effectively compensate for the loss of influence on
the national level.
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The global political landscape is characterized by changed constellations involving
new powers and unprecedented challenges. Global interdependence especially in
the field of security requires the European Union to improve its abilities. The situ-
ation is characterized by a new quality of conflicts that range from the profession-
alization of international terror and asymmetrical warfare via the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction to regional crises and the negative consequences of
state failure. These new risks and threats combined with energy dependency,
growing migration pressure, the geographic proximity to future crisis regions, and
the vital significance of unimpeded world trade for the EU economies, make
Europe a particularly vulnerable continent. For this reason Europe cannot simply
afford to stand on the sidelines when economic and political developments 
require the establishment of new forms of order.
The international responsibilities of the European Union begin in its immediate
geographic vicinity. However, Europe also needs to have at its disposal sufficient
resources to protect its interests and project its power in the global arena.
Stabilizing the Neighbourhood
The accession of ten new countries to the European Union in May 2004 was a
major contribution to the stabilization of Europe. With eastern enlargement the
European Union has overcome the division of the continent and laid the founda-
tions for the unification of Europe.
However, as a result of enlargement the EU borders on sensitive neighbourhoods.
The EU adjoins the post-Soviet space in the east, from the Barents Sea in the far
north to the Black Sea in the south, the Middle East to the southeast and the
states of northern Africa to the south. The stabilization of these areas is not only in
Europe’s interests, but at the same time constitutes a crucial contribution to the
maintenance of world peace.
The European Union has special responsibilities in the southeast of the continent.
On account of its potential and its own historical experiences, an enlarged Europe
is now in a position to make an effective contribution to the solution of the cluster
of problems in Southeastern Europe. The failure of European crisis management at
the beginning of the 1990s taught European states the necessity of working
together and served to align their interests.
The prospect of EU membership for the countries of the Western Balkans promo-
tes not only reforms and western-oriented and liberal political forces in the coun-
tries concerned, it is also in the fundamental interest of the Union and its member
states. Being linked to the European Union provides numerous opportunities for
both the Balkan countries and the EU. The positive economic development of the
region, which is underpinned by the prospect of EU membership, is indubitably in
the economic interests of the Union. Participation in the area of freedom, security
and justice ensures that the same standards apply, and reduces mutual mistrust in
sensitive areas of inter-state cooperation such as border security, combating orga-
nized crime, as well as immigration, refugee and asylum policy. To assess the costs
of Southeastern enlargement, it is imperative to take into account the costs of non-
enlargement or long-term delays in accession. A receding prospect of EU mem-
bership could cause the status quo that has already been attained in the region to
Ending the “black hole” on the
map of Europe not a question
of whether or not, but of when
and how
Consequences of a Europe
with no definitive borders
EU-27 should not shut
its doors to newcomers
No binding offers of
prospective membership
beyond the Balkans and
Turkey
Weidenfeld, Emmanouilidis, Metz · Europe’s Strategic Responses
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 4 · 2006 Page 15
be called into question. Disappointment and the lack of a perspective might lead
to new outbursts of violence among the various ethnic groups, the costs of which
would have to be borne not only by the region, but also by the EU and its member
states. A relapse into authoritarian practices, that could inflict long-term damage
on democratization efforts, cannot be ruled out in certain states.
In view of such prospects it seems clear that only the full and equal integration of
the Balkan countries into the Union at some specific point in the future can secure
the strategic advantages that the EU already derives from association and gradual
convergence. The European Council gave all states of the Western Balkans –
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro – a
specific prospect of EU membership as early as 1999, and has confirmed this offer
on numerous occasions. Accession negotiations are currently in progress with
Croatia, and Macedonia has been granted candidate status. After the accession of
Bulgaria and Romania there will be even greater pressure to close the “black hole”
on the map of Europe. Southeastern enlargement – which is not comparable to the
2004 enlargement round in terms of either size or political and economic conse-
quences – is thus not a question of whether or not, but of when and how.
However, the attractiveness of Europe does not end in the Balkans. Certain other
states are pushing very hard to join the EU. While the 2004 enlargement constitu-
ted a decisive step toward completing the vision of a united Europe organized poli-
tically in the European Union, the next historic milestone is already around the
corner. The start of accession negotiations with Turkey means that Europe has
finally come to a point where it no longer has definitive borders. In essence the
decision concerning Turkey marks the start of a large-scale process of enlargement
reaching far beyond the Balkans, and where this will end is currently impossible to
say. Europe urgently needs to understand the strategic ramifications of the path on
which it has embarked. In the context of a European Union that is continuously
enlarging, the following must be taken into account: 
(1) The European Union, which will soon comprise 27 member states, should not shut its
doors to newcomers. The possibility of joining the EU must remain open in prin-
ciple to all European states even if the prospect of membership is distant. For
most of the countries in the geographic vicinity of the European Union the pro-
spect of EU membership provides an important impetus for the initiation or
continuation of the process of political and economic transformation. Without
the long-term perspective of enlarging beyond the Western Balkans, the EU
would not be in a position to strongly influence the transformation process in
neighbouring European states. The success of individual national reforms has a
profound impact on the development of other states in the EU’s direct neigh-
bourhood. Thus the success and sustainability of internal reforms in Ukraine
and Georgia are crucially important for transformation processes in other for-
mer Soviet republics. In this context the autocratic government of Belarus
remains a special challenge for democratic Europe.
(2) The EU should however not grant any further binding accession offers beyond the
Western Balkans and Turkey. In many EU countries this would unnecessarily
exacerbate the popular dissatisfaction with the EU’s enlargement policy. Taking
into account the increasing enlargement fatigue in the EU-25, enlargement
beyond the Balkans and Turkey should be forestalled for a specific period – for
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example, until 2015 or 2020. Moreover, granting a binding prospect of EU mem-
bership would rob the European Union of one of its principal means of exerting
pressure on states in its immediate neighbourhood at an unnecessarily early
stage. Furthermore, the concrete prospect of EU membership might well lead to
exaggerated expectations in neighbouring states. Unfulfilled promises might
raise the level of frustration in the countries concerned and retard the transfor-
mation process.
(3) The EU should continue to deepen its relations with neighbouring European states
within the framework of a differentiated policy toward Eastern Europe. In this con-
text, the EU must take into account the different levels of democratization as
well as varying pro-European attitudes in the countries concerned. The EU
needs a genuine strategy for Belarus and the Black Sea region, an area that will
become even more strategically important after the accession of Bulgaria and
Romania. The European Union should initiate a Black Sea Dimension analo-
gous to the Nordic Dimension for the Baltic region. Furthermore, the EU should
also focus on Central Asia, which is becoming ever more important for Europe
in terms of security and energy policy.
(4) Cooperation with the EU’s immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Black
Sea region and Central Asia requires an active partnership with Russia. The
Russian Federation continues to be an indispensable actor in Europe. Up to
now relations between Russia and the EU have been based primarily on eco-
nomically defined interests between the government in Moscow and individu-
al EU member states. In future these relations should become increasingly
Europeanized. The relationship between the EU and Russia should be reformu-
lated with regard to both form and content by 2007 at the latest, when the cur-
rent Partnership and Cooperation Agreement expires. Both sides will for the
first time be faced with the challenge of jointly shaping overlapping spheres of
interest. Strategically, the West must take Russia seriously and secure its
involvement in key policy issues. At the same time the EU must emphasize the
values and principles on which cooperation is based, and the necessity of
democratic reforms in Russia. The European Neighbourhood Policy and EU
policy toward Russia should be aligned and coordinated on this basis in the
course of renegotiating the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Such an
approach will enable the EU and Russia to pursue coordinated policies in the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
Promoting World Peace and Asserting Global Interests
The European Union is a factor to be reckoned with in world politics on account
alone of its sheer size and economic strength. But the EU’s international signifi-
cance derives also from the fact that the voluntary pooling of sovereignty provides
a model that radiates not only to the periphery of Europe but far beyond.
Integration is not only a survival strategy for a continent composed of relatively
small states, but is also one of the principal concepts for shaping international
order in an increasingly interdependent world. The European Union attracts states
as if it were a magnet, it enlarges, it manages to promote transformation through
the prospect of membership, and as a result it exports stability to both the
European continent and to neighbouring regions.
Europe as an exposed actor
Successes of European
Security and Defence Policy
Creation of a European Army
Enhanced military capabilities,
overcoming the strategic
deficit, ability to shape global
developments
Special responsibility of
Germany, France and the
United Kingdom
Weidenfeld, Emmanouilidis, Metz · Europe’s Strategic Responses
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 4 · 2006 Page 17
At the same time, Europe is also a very exposed actor. Contrary to the expectations
of many Europeans, and in contrast to their intuition that the end of heavily armed
superpower confrontation would free them from insecurity, world affairs are expe-
riencing a period of disorder, risks, crises and unprecedented dangers. It is thus in
Europe’s best interests to assume more global responsibility.
No member state acting on its own is in a position to provide the resources and
instruments necessary to master these complex challenges. For this reason
Europeans must act jointly to create a viable foreign, security and defence policy.
A number of important steps have been taken since the establishment of the ESDP
in 1999. The development of operational capabilities and the establishment of
institutional structures for civilian and military crisis management, the establish-
ment of a European Defence Agency, the global deployment of civilian and milita-
ry EU missions, and the adoption of the European Security Strategy reflect the
European will to establish the EU as a credible and reliable actor in international
affairs.
But despite numerous advances in recent years, security and defence policy in
Europe is still characterized by divergent national approaches and perceptions and
by persisting claims to national sovereignty. Insufficient use is made of the poten-
tial synergies of closer defence policy cooperation. Europe cannot successfully
represent its interests on the global stage if it continues to merely follow an ap-
proach of selective cooperation. The provision of limited capabilities for civilian
and military crisis management on the European level is not enough. The assertion
of global interests requires a more determined effort to pool European defence
capabilities by creating a European Army with the appropriate organizational and
command structures on the European level.
The establishment of integrated armed forces would enhance Europe’s military
capabilities and promote a much more efficient use of increasingly constrained
national defence budgets. The pressure on the participating states to establish a
common market for defence equipment would increase. The creation of a
European Army would tie the states of Europe closer together in the field of secu-
rity policy than at any time in their history. Interlinking national security and
defence policies in this way would increase the pressure on EU member states to
overcome the current deficit in strategic thinking. This would promote a common
European culture of strategic thinking and planning, both regionally and globally.
The pressure on the EU and its member states to speak with one voice also on sen-
sitive security policy issues would grow. This would strengthen the profile of the
European Union on the international stage. Europe would be enabled to engage
responsibly and self-confidently in the concert of international powers and to play
a more active and relevant role in shaping global developments. A decision to
establish a common defence will also have far-reaching consequences for transat-
lantic security structures. Europe’s ability to pursue common goals with the United
States will be greatest if it is able to function as an equal partner in the transatlan-
tic alliance.
It may well be that the idea of a European Army is asking too much considering
the current level of consensus on security and defence policy among the EU-25. In
this case, it should be possible for states that are willing and able to engage in co-
operation to move ahead even if not all EU countries are prepared to participate.
In this regard the possibility of a structured military cooperation as envisaged in
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the European Constitutional Treaty points in the right direction. Germany, France
and the United Kingdom bear particular responsibility. Based on the size of their
defence expenditures, the existence of national headquarters and the ability to
pursue crisis diplomacy on the highest level, the “Big Three” possess means and
capabilities without which a European Army cannot be established.
III. A Strategy for the Promotion of European Self-Assurance
Europe is stuck in a mental crisis of orientation. European identity has always been
rather complicated and relatively weak, and has often been obscured by national
and regional allegiances. Yet in the course of the past decades a greater sense of
what it means to be European has emerged – as a result of common suffering and
subsequently of a common success story. Both constitute the basis for common
European values.
However, the certitudes of the past have given way to uncertainty. Calls to
strengthen European identity have become more audible. So far the response has
consisted largely of illustrious conferences on European culture that make feeble
attempts to pin down the soul of Europe while ultimately producing little more
than material for satirical remarks. The strategic indecision about the future of
Europe on the part of policymakers has led to confusion in the minds of EU citi-
zens. As a result there is an elementary need for orientation regarding the question
of Europe as our common fate and future. If it proves impossible to inspire a new
European self-assurance that is capable of forging a European identity, Europe will
not be able to surmount its current crisis of orientation and legitimacy.
The current lack of orientation is not a specifically European phenomenon, yet it
affects Europe more than others. In the age of globalization traditional patterns of
interpretation have begun to disintegrate everywhere in the world. A hitherto
unparalleled degree of mobility, pluralism and flexibility has led to the breakdown
of traditional types of identification. Modern man suffers from a dearth of econom-
ic, social and political orientation. There is a great need for shared descriptions and
understandings of our contemporary material and ideational environment. Under
these circumstances the European Union, as an evolving political system, has a
particular responsibility to fill the gap left by this lack of orientation.
However, this task is complicated by the fact that EU citizens have lost their con-
fidence in the abilities of policymakers. Declining trust is not a problem specific to
European institutions, but a widespread phenomenon in all areas of political life.
Yet this lack of confidence has particularly drastic consequences for the European
project, which is still primarily dominated by political elites. The European Union
enjoys a much smaller benefit of the doubt than the nation-states, and is called
into question more quickly and fundamentally than its members. Whereas the lack
of trust in policymakers has led to a renaissance of the national and above all the
regional levels, the European level has been increasingly weakened.
In order to strengthen European self-assurance Europe should pursue two things:
a gradual politicization of European politics, and a new raison d’être underpinned
by a new grand project.
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Politicization as a Step toward Maturity
A dynamic transnational democracy presupposes that citizens identify with the
political system of the European Union and that European politics receive demo-
cratic legitimation. To enhance its legitimacy, the EU must ensure that citizens
enjoy greater democratic participation. The key to this is the progressive politiciza-
tion of European policymaking as a decisive step toward a more mature political
system.
Although the institutional architecture of the European Union has developed con-
siderably in recent years, a weak point of the system is becoming ever more appar-
ent. Europe lacks resilient political debates about the content of EU policy. In large
sections of the population “Brussels” is deemed to be a bureaucratic centre, not a
centre of political activity. This perception springs above all from the fact that the
principle of opposition, the dialectics of political discourse, and the personalization
of conflicts play a minimal role in the EU’s political system.
European political life lacks the lifeblood of a thriving democracy. A political
system lives from the clash of colliding arguments, which is the essence of politics.
In contrast, the EU is structurally oriented toward consensus. Competing ideas and
concepts are not sufficiently presented and discussed on either the European or
the national level. As a result there is neither a public nor a media-driven opinion-
forming process about European issues.
What can be done to redress this deficit? First of all, this will require a change in
the minds of people. The exaggerated craving for harmony when it comes to
Europe is out-dated. Disagreement is a constituent element of every political pro-
cess and as such should not be dramatized on the European level either. In con-
trast to internal national debates, European policy disagreements still cause politi-
cians and representatives of the media to proclaim a fundamental crisis of integra-
tion. After 50 years the EU has reached a degree of inner maturity that makes it
possible to view differences of opinion, divergent interests and conflicting goals as
evidence of the vitality of the European policymaking process and not as an exis-
tential threat. The credibility of attempts to popularize the EU was in the past
undermined by the fact that the European Union was exclusively portrayed in a
positive light. In the public sphere one should paint a realistic and differentiated
picture of the European Union and portray also critical aspects concerning the
integration process.
Politicization on the European level should emulate what succeeds on the national
level. Politics is made by people, not by a collection of soulless machines. Those
who wish to make policymaking comprehensible must ensure that it is associated
with identifiable individuals. Europe requires a higher level of personalization.
Numerous innovations in the European Constitutional Treaty point in the right
direction. The envisaged appointment of a President of the European Council, the
proposed creation of a European Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the strengthen-
ing of the President of the Commission would give the EU identifiable faces that
would be the focus of trust and distrust, approval and rejection. These political
innovations should enter EU political practice even if the Constitutional Treaty ulti-
mately fails.
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The politicization of the European Union must also ensure that citizens enjoy greater
democratic participation in European politics. European issues must become a
self-evident feature of political debates at all levels. Up to now European citizens
rarely interact directly with the European Union; their perceptions of the EU rath-
er tend to be filtered through national, regional or local perspectives. Whilst
European policymaking influences the internal affairs of the member states, the
EU remains largely invisible as a political entity in people’s daily lives. Europe con-
tinues to be an artificial sideshow. If issues related to the EU are to play more than
a minor role, they must become an integral part of political debates in the member
states. The strict separation of national and European level issues in political
discourse needs to be eliminated; in the EU’s complex multi-tier system, this sepa-
ration no longer corresponds to reality. Otherwise there is a danger that policyma-
king will increasingly take place on the European level, uncoupled from popular
legitimacy. To put it in other words: the electorate must give politicians on the
national level also a mandate for their policymaking in the EU. And citizens can
only do so if more time is allotted to European politics in the course of day-to-day
political debates. There must be space for the discussion of controversies that in
turn provides citizens a choice between political alternatives.
Finally, a greater degree of politicization makes it imperative to dramatize Euro-
pean elections. By voting for MEPs of their choice, citizens should be able to exert
a direct influence on the appointment of the President of the Commission. In order
to increase the importance of the vote of EU citizens in European elections, the
procedure for electing the Commission President should be reversed. The
Commission President should not be nominated and appointed by the Heads of
State and Government. Instead, the President should be nominated by European
parties in the run-up to European Parliament elections on the basis of a common
election manifesto, and elected by the new parliament. The President of the
Commission duly elected by the European Parliament would then have to be con-
firmed by the Heads of State and Government on the basis of a qualified majority
vote. This procedure would upgrade the importance of European elections as an
act of electoral control. In addition, it would strengthen the legitimacy and power
base of the Commission and its President, while simultaneously enhancing the
significance of the European Parliament.
A higher degree of politicization will rekindle the interest of the electorate in
Europe as a political entity. Politicians on the national and European levels would
be forced to conduct debates on European policy with their voters. A greater
degree of politicization would also stimulate competition in the development of
policy innovations. Debates on competing solutions to European policy issues will
increase the pressure to form stable cross-sectoral and cross-institutional coali-
tions. The formation of cross-institutional alliances and durable majority and
minority coalitions would help to overcome blockades in an EU of 25 and more
member states. In the final analysis a greater degree of politicization would enhan-
ce the legitimacy and effectiveness of supranational actors. This would be especial-
ly important in the case of the European Commission, which in recent years has
forfeited a large part of its strategic effectiveness and influence. In sum, increased
politicization in the European Union would constitute a decisive step toward a
more mature political system.
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A New Raison d’être and a Grand Project
In addition to gradual politicization, a strategy to enhance the significance of the
European Union in the eyes of citizens must also involve the elaboration of a new
rationale explaining the necessity of the integration project. The EU, far more than
its constituent nation-states, must offer an autonomous reason that legitimizes its
existence. There are many people who do not believe that the European project is
an answer to the multifarious challenges of globalization. In the eyes of many of
its citizens the European Union is the catalyst of unfettered globalization – this
was demonstrated by the fact that in certain EU states the debate about the 2004
round of enlargement was dominated by diffuse anxieties. The European Union and
its member states need to convince citizens that Europe is part of the response to
global dynamism – they must do so not in abstract, but in concrete terms.
For this purpose the European Union does not have to be reinvented. It was built
on a solid foundation: the peaceful unification of the continent as well as econom-
ic prosperity in a single market with a common currency remain important motives
for the future. However, the old motivating factors are no longer enough to con-
vince citizens of the future value-added of the integration project. The European
Union should be re-interpreted in light of current challenges. What is needed is an
innovative and future-oriented understanding of the European idea that combines
the past and the future, stability and change, and the old and the new in equal
terms. The redefinition of the European idea is an intellectual task that needs to be
performed by European elites and communicated in the form of a new European
raison d’être.
In order to unleash new dynamism it is not necessary to arrive at a common
understanding of the ultimate finalité of the unification process. In view of the
conceptual schism among EU member states, such a debate would currently be
counter-productive. Mutual mistrust would further increase, and there would be
paralysis instead of purposeful action. Furthermore, the continuous dynamism of
globalization makes it difficult to reach agreement about a concept of the EU’s
finality: one cannot predict in which direction the world and Europe will develop.
In view of the uncertainties within and outside the old continent it is currently
impossible to define at what point enlargement or integration will actually come
to an end.
What Europe needs more urgently than finality debates is a convincing and com-
prehensible formula to explain the ongoing need for European integration in the
future. Europe needs a plain answer to a simple question. What do we need the EU
for in the future – beyond the preservation of what has already been achieved?
The European Union as a dynamic economic, political and security policy project
that is able to shape both internal and external developments in a dynamic global
environment: Putting this abstract formula in concrete terms is a prerequisite for
conveying the necessity of future integration steps. Numerous examples confirm
the global role that Europe already plays today, including the structuring of global
economic relations through WTO negotiations, the significance of the enlarged EU
in global trade, the role of Europe as a stabilizing force and supporter of peaceful
transformation processes, the function of EU integration as a model for economic
and political cooperation in other parts of the world and, finally, the “success story”
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of a pluralistic EU, which not only permits diversity, but actually profits from it, and
thereby constitutes a practical counterpoise to the “clash of civilizations”.
However, it will not be enough to proclaim this new raison d’être in the form of a
solemn declaration replete with group photo. Citizens and elites will begin to
sense a new fascination with the European project if the latter provides convincing
evidence in everyday reality. In contrast to nation-states, the Union is not stable
enough to do without a grand project from which it can derive legitimacy.
Individual projects in different policy areas will not suffice to increase the EU’s out-
put legitimacy. Such projects fall short of the mark because, as far as citizens are
concerned, they are either not visible enough, or, taken as a whole, resemble a
patchwork of unrelated individual measures. In order to revitalize the integration
project there is a need for a new grand project beyond a “Europe of small projects”.
European policymaking has always been particularly dynamic and successful when-
ever it set its sights on a large-scale and ambitious goal. The most impressive
example of this was the single market project “Europe ‘92”. Today the art of
European politics will be to combine the new raison d’être with an ambitious yet
realistic grand project that reflects the principal idea of a new Europe.
Two areas where there is both a considerable pressure for action and where citi-
zens particularly want the EU to deliver seem appropriate for a new grand project:
the field of economic and social policy, and the area of security.
Despite its undeniable significance for the citizens of Europe, the thematic cluster
of economic and social policy seems not very suitable for a new European grand pro-
ject for a variety of reasons. First, the European Union does not possess sufficient
competences in these areas and it cannot be assumed that the member states will
be prepared to centralize further responsibilities. Second, a grand project that pur-
sues the economic and social modernization of Europe would almost certainly be
accompanied by drastic cutbacks for a considerable number of people – this is
hardly to generate “new enthusiasm” for Europe among citizens. Finally, further
integration in the areas of economic and social policy that goes beyond (i) individ-
ual measures to complete the single market, (ii) mutual learning in the context of
the Open Methods of Coordination, or (iii) a mere synchronization of national
economic and social policies would be questionable from an economic point of
view. Is not the competition between the divergent national systems and between
the member states’ economies a key reason for Europe’s economic success?
Europe’s internal and external vulnerability underscores the need to develop a
grand project in the area of security. Greater security policy integration can procure
benefits for the member states and their citizens that the individual countries can
no longer provide on their own. Through the pooling of security resources, com-
mon responses to transnational problems such as cross-border crime, illegal immi-
gration, weapons proliferation, terrorism, and new regional and global risks would
result in greater efficiency and financial benefits for member states.
EU member states have long ago recognized the value of cooperation. Since
Maastricht the European Union has made considerable progress in the areas of
justice and home affairs as well as foreign, security and defence policy.Yet many of
the individual measures that have been initiated appear to be rather haphazard,
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and the overall picture lacks coherence. Furthermore, there is a lack of conceptual
interlinkage between the various aspects of internal and external security. Existing
projects in the area of security should be embedded within a clear-cut framework
with ambitious yet realistic goals. The creation of a European Army would be an
appropriate goal in the area of external security, but this would have to be com-
plemented by an equivalent project in the area of internal security. The successful
implementation of a grand project in the area of security requires the elaboration
of a coherent concept that defines European security interests in a comprehensive
manner, aligns both internal and external as well as civilian and military aspects of
security policy, identifies the specific measures that are required, and provides a
timetable that is binding on the participants.
If policymakers succeed in making the European Union a coherent actor in all
aspects of internal and external security, Europe will be in a position to make a
decisive contribution toward shaping the future international order. The epochal
decision to embark on the unification project once brought peace and prosperity
to the European continent. It is now time to view the success of the European pro-
ject from a global perspective.
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